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Abstract
Background: The International Health Regulations (IHRs) (2005) was developed with the aim of governing
international responses to public health risks and emergencies. The document requires all 194 World Health
Organization (WHO) Member States to detect, assess, notify and report any potential public health emergency of
international concern (PHEIC) under specific timelines. Annex 2 of the IHR outlines decision-making criteria for
State-appointed National Focal Points (NFP) to report potential PHEICs to the WHO, and is a critical component to
the effective functioning of the IHRs.
Methods: The aim of the study was to review and evaluate the functioning of Annex 2 across WHO-reporting
States Parties. Specific objectives were to ascertain NFP awareness and knowledge of Annex 2, practical use of
the tool, activities taken to implement it, its perceived usefulness and user-friendliness. Qualitative telephone
interviews, followed by a quantitative online survey, were administered to NFPs between October, 2009 and
February, 2010.
Results: A total of 29 and 133 NFPs participated in the qualitative and quantitative studies, respectively.
Qualitative interviews found most NFPs had a strong working knowledge of Annex 2; perceived the tool to be
relevant and useful for guiding decisions; and had institutionalized management, legislation and communication
systems to support it. NFPs also perceived Annex 2 as human and disease-centric, and emphasized its reduced
applicability to potential PHEICs involving bioterrorist attacks, infectious diseases among animals, radio-nuclear
and chemical spills, and water- or food-borne contamination. Among quantitative survey respondents, 88%
reported having excellent/good knowledge of Annex 2; 77% reported always/usually using Annex 2 for
assessing potential PHEICs; 76% indicated their country had some legal, regulatory or administrative provisions
for using Annex 2; 95% indicated Annex 2 was always/usually useful for facilitating decisions regarding
notifiability of potential PHEICs.
Conclusion: This evaluation, including a large sample of WHO-reporting States Parties, found that the IHR’s Annex
2 is perceived as useful for guiding decisions about notifiability of potential PHEICs. There is scope for the WHO to
expand training and guidance on application of the IHR’s Annex 2 to specific contexts. Continued monitoring and
evaluation of the functioning of the IHR is imperative to promoting global health security.
Keywords: International Health Regulations (IHR), World Health Organization (WHO), Annex 2, public health emer-
gency of international concern (PHEIC), evaluation
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In 2005 the World Health Assembly approved revisions
to the International Health Regulations(IHR), the pri-
mary document governing the international response to
public health risks and emergencies [1,2]. The IHR
(2005), which came into force on June 15 2007, require
all States Parties (i.e. countries that have ratified a cove-
nant or a convention and are thereby bound to conform
to its provisions) to develop and maintain effective
national capacities to detect, assess, notify and report
events and to respond to public health risks and emer-
gencies [1]. The IHR(2005) represent an important step
in achieving global health security by promoting the
preparation for, and response to, public health risks and
emergencies in a manner that does not unnecessarily
impact cross-border travel and trade [3,4].
A major innovation of the IHR(2005) was the shift
away from disease specific notification to require notifi-
cation of any events that may constitute a potential
“public health emergency of international concern”
(PHEIC) [5]. Under the IHR(2005), PHEICs are not lim-
ited to infectious diseases, but also apply to events stem-
ming from biological, radionuclear or chemical agents,
from newly discovered or unknown agents or modes of
transmission, and events transmissible via persons, vec-
tors, cargo, goods and environmental diffusion [6].
While the first and only deceleration of a PHEIC by the
Director General of the World Health Organization
(WHO) was the H1N1 outbreak, events such as the
export of melamine contaminated foods detected in
2008, the international spread of measles through trave-
lers, the meltdown of a Japanese nuclear power plant in
2011 and the recent E.Coli outbreak in Europe have all
been considered potential PHEICs [7,8].
In order to assist States Parties in determining
whether a potential PHEIC should be reported to the
WHO, the IHR(2005) requires all States Parties to carry
out an assessment of public health events arising in
their territories using a decision instrument contained in
Annex 2 of the Regulations. Under Annex 2, notification
by States Parties to WHO must occur if the response to
two of four criteria is affirmative, or if an event constitu-
tes any of the following: poliomyelitis, smallpox, human
i n f l u e n z ac a u s e db yan e ws u b t y p e ,S e v e r eA c u t e
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), cholera, plague, yellow
fever, viral hemorrhagic fevers, West Nile virus, or dis-
eases of regional concern such as meningococcal disease
and dengue) (see Additional File 1). States Parties are
required to notify the WHO of all qualifying events
within 24 hours of confirmation [6].
Annex 2 is considered a critical component to the
effective functioning of the Regulations, since its goal is
to expand the number and scope of events reported to
the WHO by States Parties, thereby strengthening
WHO’s capacity to monitor and pro-actively respond to
public health risks and emergencies. The World Health
Assembly (WHA) mandated the Director-General of
WHO to review and evaluate the functioning of deci-
sion-making tool [1]. The University of Ottawa was
commissioned by the WHO to undertake a qualitative
study and quantitative survey to explore States Parties
awareness, practical use of, usefulness and perceived
user-friendliness of Annex 2 through an interview
among a representative sample of States Parties (qualita-
tive study) and an online survey involving all States Par-
ties (quantitative study).
Methods
This review and evaluation of the functioning of Annex
2 was conducted between October 2009 and February
2010, and consisted of two consecutive studies: first, a
qualitative study based on semi-structured telephone
interviews, and second, a quantitative online survey. In
both studies the objectives were to assess the following
among State Parties: a) awareness of Annex 2; b) com-
prehension of the purpose and content of Annex 2; c)
use of Annex 2; d) practical implementation of Annex 2;
e) usefulness of Annex 2; f) perceived user-friendliness
of Annex 2; g) and challenges and success of Annex 2.
Qualitative interviews were used to identify salient
themes, and to fine-tune wording of questions, for the
larger quantitative survey.
Study Participants
Study participants for both the qualitative and quantita-
tive studies consisted of National IHR Focal Points
(NFPs) from WHO-reporting countries. The term
“NFP” denotes an institution or office, rather than indi-
vidual, that has been designated by its States Party as
the WHO-communication centre for potential PHEICs
under Article 4 of the IHR [9].
WHO State Parties are responsible for defining the
NFPs specific position and role within their existing
structures. As a consequence, NFPs vary across Member
States in terms of their professional qualifications, insti-
tutional locations (ie. government departments), and
decision-making abilities. The WHO’sN a t i o n a lI H R
Focal Point Guide describes NFP roles, functions and
operational requirements under the IHR [9]. According
to the guide, the NFP must be available and accessible
at all times (7/24/365) for urgent reciprocal communica-
tion (via email, telephone and/or fax) with WHO IHR
Contact Points. The NFP is responsible for consolidating
national public health event surveillance data from all
relevant sectors of government, for communicating with
WHO IHR Contact Points, on behalf of the State Party
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PHEICs [9].
Qualitative Study
A total of 29 States Parties were purposively selected for
participation in the qualitative study and represented a
diversity of geographic regions, size, population demo-
graphics, economic development, and epidemiological
profiles. The sample was weighted to low- and middle-
income States Parties to ensure that their unique per-
spectives were adequately captured. NFPs from these
selected States Parties were invited to voluntarily partici-
pate in a 1.5 hour interview by email, and offered inter-
preters to conduct the interview in the language of their
choice. The study team, with input from the IHR Coordi-
nation Department of WHO, developed an interview pro-
tocol focused on the study objectives and consisting of
open-ended questions. During interviews, the study team
tested the reliability of NFP responses by means of trian-
gulation, a process which cross-examines emerging
themes and considers them valid only once two of three
questions produce similar answers. Oral and signed con-
sent were obtained from each participant. Telephone
interviews were digitally audio-recorded, and transcribed
verbatim [10]. Data analysis was facilitated with the use
of a qualitative research software, NVivo (version 8.0)
(QSR International Pty Ltd., 2008, Melbourne, Australia)
to code and sort the collected qualitative data. Two
researchers analyzed data in duplicate to ensure that par-
ticipants’ viewpoints were adequately interpreted [11].
Quantitative Study
Subsequent to the qualitative interviews, all 193 States
Parties were invited to participate in the quantitative
survey, with the goal of obtaining an exhaustive sample.
Contact details were supplied by the IHR Coordination
Department. Participants were invited to voluntarily par-
ticipate in the study via email. The survey containing an
embedded participant consent form, was administered
to States Parties via a secure internet-based web portal
http://www.QuestionPro.com, and was available in all
six official languages of the World Health Assembly.
Only one answer was allowed for each State Party. Key
variables were measured through dichotomous
responses and Likert-type scales. PASW Statistics (ver-
sion 18.0) (SPSS, Inc., 2009, Chicago, USA) was used to
clean the dataset and to generate descriptive statistics.
Participation in both studies was on a voluntary basis.
Ethics
The qualitative and quantitative study methodology
underwent ethical review at the University of Ottawa
and was exempted from review by the WHO Research
Ethics Review Committee.
Results
Response Rate
Among the 193 States Parties eligible to participate, a
total of 29(15.0%) NFPs participated in qualitative tele-
phone interviews, and 133(68.9%) completed the quanti-
tative online survey. Response rates for the studies
varied by WHO region (Figure 1).
Country Surveillance Capacity
In the quantitative survey, the majority of NFPs reported
having either excellent (30[22.9%]) or good (58[44.2%])
ability to assess potential PHEICs under the IHR’s
Annex 2. NFPs indicated that they received surveillance
data from government agencies, to which they apply
Annex 2, in the following proportions: Health 127
(95.5%), Agriculture 77(57.9%); Environment 45(33.8%);
National Security 22(16.5%); Transportation 17(12.8%);
and Energy 8(6.0%). NFPs’ access to surveillance infor-
mation was reportedly higher for events involving infec-
tious diseases (Table 1).
Awareness and knowledge of Annex 2
NFPs participating in qualitative interviews were unan-
imously aware of Annex 2, and had varying in-depth
knowledge about the tool, depending on their prior
exposure to WHO guidance and trainings. Some con-
fusion persisted among NFPs that had not accessed
any training regarding operational and communication
procedures for notifying WHO about potential
PHEICs. In the quantitative survey, 112(88.2%) NFPs
indicated they had ‘excellent’ or ‘good’ knowledge of
Annex 2, and 108(82.1%) had accessed some form of
WHO training about Annex 2. When we explored the
statistical association between NFPs knowledge of
Annex 2 and access to training, we found that NFPs
who had accessed WHO training were significantly
more likely to report having ‘excellent’ or ‘good’
knowledge of Annex 2, compared to those that had
n o ta c c e s s e da n yt r a i n i n g( p=0 . 0 3 ) .
Qualitative interviews with NFPs also revealed that
many States Parties were expanding awareness and use
of Annex 2 beyond the national / f e d e r a ll e v e l ,t os t a t e
and municipal public health officials and even front-
line clinicians. In the quantitative survey, 37(29.8%)
NFPs rated the overall awareness of Annex 2 at the
national/federal government level as ‘excellent’ or
‘good’, compared to only 19(16.1%) at the provincial/
state/canton and 13(10.1%) at municipal/local levels. A
total of 93(70.5%) of NFPs reported ‘excellent’ or
‘good’ awareness of Annex 2 in Health agencies, com-
pared to 32(24.8%) in Agriculture, 21(16.4%) in Envir-
onment, 20(15.6%) in National Security, 13(10.2%) in
Transportation, 12(9.4%) in Justice, and 7(5.6%) in
Energy.
Anema et al. Globalization and Health 2012, 8:1
http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/8/1/1
Page 3 of 9Practical Use of Annex 2
Frequency of Use
The qualitative interviews re v e a l e dt h a tN F P sa r eu s i n g
Annex 2 with varying levels of frequency. While some
have instituted a routine practice of applying Annex 2
to all public health events that emerge in their national
surveillance system, others reserve the tool for events
they suspect may qualify for notification under Annex
2’s criteria. The quantitative survey revealed that 59
(46.8%) respondents indicating they ‘always’ use Annex
2 and 38(30.2%) indicating they ‘usually’ use the tool for
the notification assessment of potential PHEICs.
Training
The qualitative interviews revealed that many NFPs are
leading trainings about Annex 2 within their countries
through a range of mechanisms. Some NFPs indicated
they had conducted informal trainings about Annex 2,
while others had developed elaborate training curricula
and ‘trainers of trainers’ for the purpose of increasing
knowledge, institutional memory and succession plan-
ning regarding Annex 2. In the quantitative survey, 84
(67.2%) NFPs indicated they had facilitated trainings
about Annex 2, which were conducted largely within
government health agencies (Table 2).
Legal, Regulatory or Administrative Instruments
During the qualitative interviews, many NFPs explained
that their country had some form of legislation pertaining
to Annex 2 in place, usually regarding infectious diseases.
In the quantitative survey, 94(76.4%) NFPs responded that
their country had some form of legal, regulatory or
  Africa  Americas  Eastern 
Mediterranean 
Europe  South-East 
Asia 
Western Pacific  Overall 
Qualitative 
Survey 
 
7/46 (15%)  6/35 (17%)  7/21 (33%)  3/53 (6%)  3/11 (27%)  3/27 (11%)  29/193 (15%) 
 
Quantitative 
Survey 
30/46 (65%)  28/35 (80%)  9/21 (43%)  41/53 (77%)  6/11 (55%)  19/27 (70%)  133/193 (69%) 
 
Figure 1 Participant response rate for qualitative and quantitative surveys, disaggregated by World Health Organization (WHO)
region.
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health events in accordance with Annex 2, either in place
or under development. Of these States Parties, 33(35.9%)
had guidelines to facilitate interpretation of this federal/
national legislation regarding Annex 2. Consistent with
qualitative findings, 91(68.4%) NFPs indicated they had
legislation concerning the four diseases requiring notifica-
tion in all circumstances under the IHR (2005)’s Annex 2:
91(68.4%) human influenza caused by a new subtype; 82
(61.7%) for wild-type poliomyelitis; 85(63.9%) for SARS;
and 75(56.4%) for smallpox.
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)
Qualitative interviews with NFPs revealed that several
States Parties had Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)
that provided guidance on the deployment of human/
financial resources, inter/intra-agency and public commu-
nication, and other operation-based activities pertaining to
the assessment and notification of potential PHEICs under
Annex 2. Several countries indicated they had SOPs for
specific locations within their territory and for certain sce-
narios. In the quantitative survey, 68(54.4%) NFPs indi-
cated that they had a formal SOP for the implementation
of Annex 2 either in place or in development. Among
these State Parties 39(29.2%) had SOPs to guide assess-
ment and notification of potential PHEICS for points of
entry, 28(21.1%) for ships, 28(21.1%) for front-line public
health settings (e.g. clinics, hospitals), 16(12.0%) for animal
farms, 11(8.3%) for food processing plants, 9(6.8%) for
water treatment plants, 8(6.0%) for international popula-
tion gatherings, and 7(5.3%) for industrial plants.
Communication Systems
During the qualitative interviews, several NFPs explained
they had domestic communication plans in place to ensure
timely detection, assessment and monitoring of potential
PHEICs within their country. Many NFPs expressed a
desire to improve their communication with international
stakeholders including WHO, but had varying levels of
comfort regarding early communication about surveillance
data with WHO officials and NFPs from neighboring coun-
tries. Predominant concerns regarding early communica-
tion with WHO officials and NFPs from neighboring
countries included the fear that it may raise unnecessary
alarm in WHO and neighboring governments, may cause
excessive media attention and may lead to unnecessary tra-
vel or trade restrictions (Table 3). In the quantitative sur-
vey, 99(74.4%) of NFPs responded that they had a domestic
communications plan in place or in development to facili-
tate intra-country communication about public health
events of potential international concern.
Usefulness of Annex 2
In the qualitative interviews, most NFPs expressed that
they found Annex 2 to be very useful for deciding upon
Table 1 National IHR Focal Point (NFP) reported access to specific types of public health event data for assessment
under the International Health Regulations (IHR)(2005)
Types of public health event data Number (%) NFPs with access to specific types of
public health event data (n = 133)
Human influenza caused by new sub-type 126 (94.7%)
Wild-type poliomyelitis 98 (73.7%)
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 79 (59.4%)
Smallpox 60 (45.1%)
Other communicable diseases 94 (70.7%)
Contaminated food (i.e. substance and microbial contamination) 93 (69.9%)
Contaminated water 76 (57.1%)
Radionuclear spill 38 (28.6%)
Chemical contamination of products or the environment 52 (39.1%)
Other toxic release 33 (24.8%)
Bioterrorist attack 45 (33.8%)
Pharmaceutical product (contamination, adverse event, failure) 64 (48.1%)
Communicable diseases among animals 81 (60.9%)
Table 2 Number of National IHR Focal Points (NFPs) that
reported facilitating trainings about Annex 2 of
International Health Regulations (IHR) in specific
government agencies
Type of government agency Number (%) trainings facilitated
by NFPs (n = 133)
Health 83 (62.4%)
Agriculture 49 (36.8%)
National Security 33 (24.8%)
Environment 33 (24.8%)
Transportation 30 (22.6%)
Justice 10 (7.5%)
Energy 7 (5.3%)
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larly for those PHEICs deemed automatically notifiable
under Annex 2 (see Additional File 1). However, some
raised concerns that, in the absence of any accepted, evi-
dence-based hierarchy of pathogens and toxins, Annex 2
was difficult to apply to certain events such as human
influenza caused by a new subtype, food- and water-
borne events, and chemicals p i l l s .S e v e r a lN F P s
described Annex 2 as overly human-centric, limiting its
application to potential PHEICs consisting of commu-
nicable diseases among animals. In the quantitative sur-
vey, 116(95%) NFPs indicated that Annex 2 was ‘always’
or ‘usually’ useful in facilitating decisions regarding
whether a public health event has to be notified to
WHO. NFPs found Annex 2 ‘fully relevant’ for infec-
tious diseases, such as smallpox (114[87.7%]), SARS (110
[84.0%]), and human influenza cause by a new subtype
(110[84.0%]), and less relevant for communicable dis-
eases among animals 35[27.1%]), chemical contamina-
tion of products or the environment (57[44.5%]), and
contaminated water (52[40.6%]) or foods (5[41.4%]).
User-friendliness of Annex 2
During the qualitative interviews most NFPs indicated
that the 24-hour timeline for notification of a potential
PHEIC to WHO was reasonable, but delays were inevi-
table due to the need to obtain clearance from senior
government officials. In the survey, 113(89.0%) NFPs
reported that the 24-hour timeline for notification was
reasonable. However, 51(40.2%) NFPs require clearance
from 2-3 individuals/offices prior to notification to
WHO, contributing to delays in notification.
Interviews revealed that the majority of NFPs felt that
the four decision instrument criteria of Annex 2 were
clear but could benefit from refinements in the algo-
rithm and checklist in order to prevent difficulties in
interpretation. In the quantitative survey, NFPs indicated
that the user-friendliness of Annex 2 could be improved
if NFPs had access to disease-specific incidence thresh-
old values to facilitate assessment of each criterion (67
[50.4%]), guidance on how to interpret surveillance data
in the specific national context (63[47.4%]), and more
case scenarios for training (90[67.7%]). Just over half of
all NFPs additionally suggested that the development of
a centralized online communication platform would be
useful in order to expand notification options, improve
communication between NFPs from neighboring coun-
tries and contribute to training in the use of Annex 2
(68[56.7%]).
Discussion
Overall, our findings suggest that there is overwhelming
support for Annex 2 among NFPs. Although States Par-
ties appear to have varied capacities in event-based sur-
veillance, we found that the vast majority of NFPs had a
strong awareness and knowledge of Annex 2, particu-
larly those within government health agencies. Annex 2
was deemed useful for assessing communicable diseases,
and less helpful for discerning other types of potential
PHEICs. NFPs cited numerous initiatives to support the
Table 3 National IHR Focal Points (NFPs) concerns about early communication with World Health Organization (WHO)
and with NFPs from neighboring countries regarding a potential public health emergency of international concern
(PHEIC)
NFP concerns regarding early communication Communication with WHO country
and regional offices
(n = 133)
Communication with NFPs from
neighboring States Parties
(n = 133)
Yes (%) Yes (%)
Early communication may unnecessarily raise alarm in WHO 31 (23.3%) 15 (11.3%)
Early communication may unnecessarily raise alarm in my
government
33 (24.8%) 20 (15.0%)
Early communication may unnecessarily raise alarm in the
government of a neighboring country
21 (15.8%) 41 (30.8%)
Early communication may create unnecessary media
attention
37 (27.8%) 33 (24.8%)
Early communication may result in unnecessary trade/travel
restrictions
24 (18.0%) 29 (21.8%)
Early communication may overburden country and regional
offices and NFPs
14 (10.5%) 15 (11.3%)
Early communication utilizes our limited telephone
communications budget
6 (4.5%) 4 (3.0%)
None of the above 56 (42.1%) 60 (45.1%)
Other 8 (6.0%) 6 (4.5%)
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tions on how to improve its user-friendliness.
Our results indicate that States Parties’ ability to
detect potential PHEICs was strongest in government
health agencies, and lowest in agencies of national
security, transportation and energy. Results from this
study suggest that many States Parties may be struggling
to establish core capacities in event-based surveillance
[12]. The IHR (2005) calls upon State Parties to enhance
their surveillance and response infrastructure and neces-
sary logistical and human resource capacity across all
governments sectors by 2012 [13]. However, for many
low resource countries, the development of an epidemic
intelligence framework across multiple sectors, as has
been done in the European Union for example [14],
poses a serious financial challenge [15] and may explain
the significant variation between States Parties’ reported
surveillance capacity [16-19]. These findings suggest
there is scope for the WHO to further support States
Parties in enhancing their national surveillance, poten-
tially by leveraging existing bilateral partnerships
focused on capacity building [20].
We also found that the majority of NFPs regularly
used Annex 2 for the assessment of public health events,
and had taken active steps towards institutionalizing its
use in their national, regional and municipal surveillance
systems. The majority of NFPs had facilitated trainings
about Annex 2 in their country, many had developed
general SOPs and systems to facilitate rapid communi-
cation of public health events from municipal to
national levels of government. Of note, the vast majority
of States Parties had some form of legal, regulatory or
administrative provisions supporting the use of Annex 2
and many had guidelines to facilitate its interpretation.
These findings suggest that most States Parties are
meeting their IHR core capacity requirements for the
establishment of national legislation and policy [12], and
that many federations, where public health regulatory
power resides in local or regional governments, may be
centralizing and harmonizing their public health policies
and practices, allowing them to better comply with the
IHR(2005) [21-23]. The fact that most States Parties
indicated they had legislation specific to the four dis-
eases requiring automatic under the IHRs Annex 2, and
had SOPs to guide use of Annex 2 in diverse settings,
suggests that cross-national management systems are in
place to effectively notify WHO of potential PHEICs.
Our findings also suggest that NFPs generally per-
ceived Annex 2 to be very user-friendly. NFPs cited the
timeline for notification of a potential PHEIC as reason-
able and that the algorithm and checklists represented a
substantial improvement over the previous IHR disease
list. Overall, NFPs felt that Annex 2 was simple to read
and clear, particularly when applied to communicable
diseases. However, NFPs described having difficulties in
gauging the severity of certain types of public health
events, given the absence of evidence-based thresholds
(e.g. contamination of food and water, infectious dis-
eases among animals and chemical contamination of
products or the environment). These findings are con-
s i s t e n tw i t hap u b l i s h e dr e p o r t e df r o mo n eS t a t eP a r t y
in sub-Saharan Africa that indicated the country lacked
surveillance guidelines and case definitions for outbreak
response to food, chemical and radio-nuclear hazards
[18]. In developing countries, effective detection of food
and water-borne diseases requires significant improve-
ments in laboratory infrastructure and expertise [24].
Meanwhile, the surveillance and reporting of chemical,
nuclear and radiological threats have been described as
persistent challenges by several States Parties in both
developing and developed countries [25], complicating
planning for major incidents [26]. Further guidance
where possible, on global standardization of rare types
of public health events were deemed necessary by NFPs.
Our findings regarding NFP awareness, knowledge and
efforts to integrate Annex 2 into national legislation,
organizational procedures and communication systems
appears to be in direct contrast with results from the
recent WHO Database Study which found that notifica-
tion of public health events by NFPs has remained quite
limited [27]. A potential explanation for this discordance
is that Annex 2 was designed and written in such a way
as to be intentionally non-specific. It has been assumed
that this intentional ambiguity would broaden the type
and numbers of notifiable events under the IHR (2005)
and lead to an over-reporting of public health events by
National IHR Focal Points to WHO. However, that
intentional ambiguity may actually be having the oppo-
site effect. Lack of detail in Annex 2 may in fact have
allowed more discretion in reporting which in turn
could have resulted in more conservative notification
practices.
Implications of Findings
There are several steps WHO and States Parties can
take to further improve the use of Annex 2 (Additional
File 2). Since having a thorough and confident under-
standing of Annex 2 was associated with having
accessed WHO guidance and training on the tool, there
is a need to ensure that all NFPs access some form of
training regarding Annex 2, and especially the WHO’s
Guidance for the Use of Annex 2 of the IHR(2005) [28].
A mechanism to prevent the non-specificity of Annex 2
as a reason to err on the side of not reporting and to
support NFPs in any internal disputes over notification,
would be to provide more specific examples of what
classes of conditions would require reporting through
an increased number of case scenarios. If a case study of
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it could reduce discretion resulting in the decision to
not report. NFPs unanimously found the case scenarios
contained within WHO’s Interim Guidance for the Use
of Annex 2 of the IHR(2005)[6] to be helpful for obtain-
ing a strong working knowledge of the tool.
Several States Parties have demonstrated a tremendous
amount of innovation with regard to activities they have
taken to support Annex 2. In some circumstances, these
activities to support Annex 2 may constitute ‘best prac-
tices’ that other States Parties can learn from and warrant
closer attention. There is equally a need for WHO to
develop parameters for the appropriation/modification of
Annex 2 by States Parties. Furthermore, while the inten-
tion and one of the great strengths of Annex 2 is to
require an interpretation of public health events taking
into account the context in which they occur, there is
scope for WHO to support NFPs in their notification
assessment by developing thresholds for the seriousness
and risk of spread for specific events and circumstances.
T h em a j o r i t yo fN F P ss u p p o r t e dt h eu s eo fac e n t r a -
lized, web-based platform to simultaneously strengthen
training in the use of Annex 2, information sharing with
NFPs from neighboring States Parties, and notification of
potential PHEICs to WHO, Internet-based reporting has
been associated with increased timeliness of outbreak
detection and public communication [29], and is becom-
ing increasingly feasible in developing countries due to
growing Internet access, IT user-friendliness and reduced
costs [30]. Automated syndromic surveillance system
could complement existing laboratory and public health
surveillance programs, and be maintained with minimal
investment into technological or human resources [30].
Study Limitations
When considering the findings of our study it is impor-
tant to recognize the limitations of the methodology.
First, our evaluation sampled NFPs. These individuals
would be expected to be amongst the most supportive
and knowledgeable individuals of the IHR (2005) within
a State Party. Similar enthusiasm and knowledge for the
IHR cannot necessarily be expected to exist in other
parts of the public health surveillance and response sys-
tem and could reflect on the ability of a States Party to
utilize Annex 2. Furthermore NFPs may not necessarily
play the key role in the risk assessment of an event
occurring within the territory of a given State Party.
This process may involve decision makers based outside
the respective NFP. While the studies were addressed to
NFPs, the only national stakeholder clearly identifiable
and accessible by WHO, no restrictions were imposed
on NFPs regarding consultation with other relevant
decision makers. However, because of the anonymous
n a t u r eo ft h es u r v e yw ed on o tk n o ww h e t h e rt h e
answers that we received from NFPs represent the views
of individual risk assessors within the NFP, the entire
NFP team, or a group of collaborators including
national experts outside of the NFP. Additionally, our
findings are susceptible to responder bias. NFPs that did
participate may have been systematically different from
those that did not. In particular we noted a differential
response per WHO Region, with comparatively less
responses from the Eastern Mediterranean and South
East Asia, and more responses from the Americas and
Europe. Non-response from certain States Parties may
be explained by individual circumstances (e.g. workload),
cultural norms, or participant exhaustion (from other
recent WHO evaluation [31]). Future evaluations should
seek to verify whether observations from the present
study are representative of those regions. Also, for those
NFPs we obtained responses from, there is the risk of
social desirability bias. It is possible, for example, that
participants modified their responses (e.g. regarding
awareness, knowledge, usefulness of Annex 2) in order
to satisfy WHO headquarters representatives associated
with the study. Finally, descriptive results from this
study should be interpreted as baseline data for subse-
quent in depth analysis and longitudinal investigation.
Conclusion
Our findings suggest that there is overwhelming support
for Annex 2 among States Parties. Many States Parties
had taken active steps towards institutionalizing the
IHR’s Annex 2 in their national, regional and municipal
surveillance systems, suggesting State commitment to
the development of IHR core capacities. States Parties’
ability to detect potential PHEICs was strongest in gov-
ernment health agencies, and lowest in agencies of
national security, transportation and energy, pointing
towards areas for possible expansion of WHO-supported
capacity building efforts. The IHR’sA n n e x2w a s
deemed highly useful for assessing notification of infec-
tious diseases, but less helpful for evaluating other types
potential PHEICs, suggesting scope for the WHO to
expand and refine its guidance documents.
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events that may constitute a public health emergency of
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